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Abstract
European Parliament elections create structural advantages for challenger parties.
Building on the second-order elections theory, this article argues that European
Parliament elections foster challenger parties’ success on the national level by in-
creasing their visibility and offering an opportunity structure for domestic politi-
cisation of Europe. I test this proposition by exploiting the quasi-exogenous timing
of European Parliament elections and the variation in national electoral cycles since
1979. A country-fixed effects model and two placebo-tests show that populist rad-
ical right parties gain momentum in the supranational contest, particularly when
coinciding campaigns increase the domestic salience of Europe. Considering their
antagonism to an integrative Europe, it seems ironic that the European Parliament
elections foster the ascendency of just these opponents of the European idea.
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Only eight months after having narrowly missed the five percent threshold in the German
Federal Election in 2013, the populist right ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) gained more
than 7% of the German votes in the European Parliament (EP) elections. Immediately after this
success, nation-wide opinion polls reported a surge in public support to eight percentage points,
indicating that the party would pass the national threshold if elections were to take place. Mean-
while, the ‘Sverigedemokraterna’ (SD) doubled their result in the Swedish ‘Riksdag’ election four
months after their unexpected success in the 2014 EP elections. Born only a couple of months
prior to the EP elections 2014, also the Spanish ‘Podemos’ movement drew crucial momentum
from the broad media coverage related to their European success, helping the young party to
become the third largest party in the Spanish general election a year later.
According to the second-order elections theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980), challenger parties are
likely to be successful in European elections. While the EP election is supra-national in nature,
the related campaigns still take place on the national level, and national parties run for office in
the European contests. Within each country the party system, media, and electorate are virtu-
ally identical in the domestic and European arena. Offering structural advantages to challenger
parties, the institution of EP elections may have unanticipated consequences for national party
competition (van der Brug and de Vreese 2016). Although the literature has established that
second-order elections facilitate the success of challenger parties (Hix and Marsh 2007), it is not
fully understood how their success in the second-order arena relates to their national perform-
ance (Somer-Topcu and Zar 2014). Despite low levels of voter turnout, the very institutional
existence of the EP elections offers challenger actors a forum to promote their policy-demands
and to attract national attention.
This article argues that challenger parties gain momentum in EP elections. Building on the
second-order elections theory, it posits that the EP elections foster challenger parties’ success on
the national level. I test this proposition by exploiting the variation in national electoral cycles
and the quasi-exogenous timing of EP elections since 1979. The results show that particularly
populist radical right parties draw crucial momentum from the supranational contest. Their
national gains are greatest when the European and the national election are close in time. By
changing the focus from the European to the national arena, the paper contributes to an emer-
ging research agenda on the national implications of EP elections (Dinas and Riera 2018; Franklin
2017; Franklin and Hobolt 2011; Markowski 2016; van der Brug and de Vreese 2016). The study
disentangles the spillover effect from alternative explanations and sheds light on the underlying
mechanisms of the spillover, establishing that: (a) the impact of EP elections on the national for-
tune of the radical right does not only stem from congruent voter preferences across governance
levels; and that (b) themere event of the EP contest benefits radical right actors when the national
election is close in time. The EP elections offer an opportunity structure for the populist right to
make their antagonism towards further integration domestically salient, potentially imperilling
the European project.
In times of growing nationalism and the rise of populism across Europe, it is important to un-
derstand the implications that EP elections have for challenger parties’ national success. Shed-
ding light on the mechanisms that augment the domestic prospects of challengers, this paper




Electoral success for challenger parties in EP elections
Existing research shows that challenger parties have higher chances of electoral success in EP
elections than in national elections because of: (a) the secondary character of the EP elections;
(b) their stances on Europe in their policy proposals; and (c) the permissiveness of the electoral
system in the European arena.
First, according to the seminal second-order elections theory, challenger parties have better
prospects to succeed in EP elections since the elected representatives in the European arena do
not decide about government formation and no immediate policy-implications accrue out of the
EP result. This renders the EP elections secondary to the national elections (Reif and Schmitt
1980; van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh 1996), which bears implications for citizens’ voting ra-
tionale. Voters use the supranational elections instrumentally to express dissatisfaction with
their national governments (Hix and Marsh 2007). Moreover, voters are likely to defect from
their national party choice due to the lack of parties’ mobilisation efforts during European cam-
paigns (Weber 2007). Second, the EP elections are favourable to challenger parties as some voters
engage in EU-issue voting. Those voters, in turn, are inclined to support a challenger in the EP
elections since mainstream parties are commonly more pro-European than their average sup-
porters are (Hobolt et al. 2009; Irwin 1995; Reif and Schmitt 1997). Many radical parties have
a particularly strong anti-European position (Hooghe et al. 2002), contributing to the politicisa-
tion of Europe (Grande and Hutter 2016; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). Considering that they are
not internally split on European stances as many mainstream parties are, they systematically
perform better in EP elections (Ferrara 2004). With voters being less supportive of European
integration than mainstream political elites are, radical parties representing anti-European atti-
tudes and making European issues salient enjoy an advantage (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004;
van Egmond 2007). Third, EP elections augment challengers’ prospects based on the proportional
electoral system applied. While some of the member states use a majoritarian electoral system
nationally, as of 1999, all European representatives are elected proportionally. Thus, challenger
parties enjoy also ‘mechanical’ advantages in European elections as opposed to some national
contests (Oppenhuis et al. 1996).
In sum, the distinct subordinated character and the salience of European policies prompt a
different voting rationale among voters who turn out in European elections.1 Many of these
voters express their dissatisfaction with their national governments or align their vote closely
with their policy preference (being European, domestic, or Eurosceptic in nature). For both reas-
ons, challenger parties enjoy advantages in the EP elections, which may be further amplified by
the permissive electoral system in EP elections. In the following, I contend that the benefits for
challenger parties in the European arena also boost their domestic prospects. European elect-
oral successes may heighten a challenger party’s visibility in the domestic arena – in particular,




Domestic momentum and the effect of electoral timing
I argue that challenger parties gain momentum (Holbrook 1996:130; Mutz 1997) through success-
ful performance in EP elections. Virtually the same national parties and major national actors
contest both elections (van der Eijk and van der Brug 2007:7), even if the results in the respective
elections are determined by a different voting rationale. Therefore, competing parties and media
may consider a challenger party’s success in the EP arena an indicator for its likely next national
performance. Success of a challenger party in the second-order arena leads to increased national
media attention, a heightened domestic visibility of the party, and greater attention levels by
party elites (Oppenhuis et al. 1996:302). This reaction of media and competitors is particularly
pronounced if the supranational performance has domestic significance in potentially polarising
national party competition (Vasilopoulou 2017).
A strong EP performance coupled with an increased visibility of the party may heighten the
chances that individuals vote for the party in the next national election. Research on United
States (US) primary elections shows that information on mass support for a certain candid-
ate does not only impact strategic vote considerations (Zech 1975), but even evokes attitudinal
change among some voters (Mutz 1997). Confronted with information on high support levels
for a certain candidate, so-called ‘consensus cues’, individuals re-evaluate the candidate based
on this information. They rehearse their political views in light of the arguments that they deem
explanatory for the high mass support levels. Importantly, this process involves priming of the
perceived others’ political views and cognitive engagement with arguments that ‘would not oth-
erwise have come to mind’ (Mutz 1997:105). After successfully competing in the EP elections, a
challenger party and its policy positions are primed in the minds of voters.
Yet, the proposed effects presume that the EP election is cognitively available to voters and
national party actors. European politics, however, tend to take place in the shadow of national
politics (Beaudonnet and Franklin 2016). Only when the temporal distance between both elec-
tions is short, European issues enjoy some prominence in national elections. Analysing the im-
pact of exogenous events on EU news coverage across seven EU members, Boomgaarden et al.
(2010) find that media coverage increases strongest during the EP elections and the following
installation of a new EU commission. Rauh (2015) points towards greater levels of domestic
politicisation of EU affairs in parliamentary debates around the period of national and European
elections. The character of the EP election as exogenous event prompts partisan competition and
draws domestic actors’ attention to this issue, resulting in a potential contention around the issue.
Media and party elites are more attentive to the supranational contest when the two elections
are close in time (Oppenhuis et al. 1996:301; Somer-Topcu and Zar 2014), which should increase
the momentum that challenger parties draw from their European success. Temporal proximity
between the two elections encourages evaluations and political judgements of challenger parties
based on the information pertaining to this European campaign. This should increase the chance
that individuals base their vote decision on the ‘consensus cues’ taken from the supranational
campaign. Importantly, voters gain such cues and may accordingly rehearse their domestic vote
choice irrespective of their actual participation in the EP elections, which is important in light
of the low turnout levels at those secondary contests.
Consequently, I posit that the momentum effects of success in the EP arena are greatest when
4
Schulte-Cloos
the two elections are close in time. Domestic campaigns that coincide with the event of EP
elections are more permissive to the issue of European integration and authority transfer to the
supranational level. I expect that the potential for spillover of electoral success depends on the
domestic attention levels towards the European performance of a challenger party and on the
general salience of European integration during a national campaign. Both the former and the
latter are greatest when the temporal distance between both elections is small.
H1: The higher the vote share of a challenger party in the EP elections, the greater the in-
crease in national electoral gains.
H2: The closer in time national and EP election take place, the stronger the effect of the vote
share in the EP election on the increase in national electoral gains.
Design and data
If EP elections foster the success of challenger parties, a strong EP electoral result should be
associated with an increase in the national performance, in particular if the two elections are
close in time. To test this, I create a dataset including the national election results of European
member states2 since the first EP election on 10 June 1979, the respective European election
results, the dates of both elections, and the temporal distance between them (Döring and Manow
2016; European Election Database 2016).
Electoral results and the European cycle
The analysis considers the national performance of all challenger parties in European member
states starting from 1979. Challenger parties are broadly defined as non-mainstream parties, i.e.
green, radical left and populist radical right party actors (e.g. Hernández and Kriesi 2016). The
classification follows expert surveys (Bakker et al. 2015; Benoit and Laver 2006; Castles and Mair
1984; Huber and Inglehart 1995). Given different degrees of party (system) institutionalisation
across the European member states and corresponding different lengths of party survival, the
main analysis considers the respective party family within each national election of a country as
the unit of observation (see for a similar approach Oppenhuis et al. 1996:291). Table 1 indicates
the robustness of the respective results to using the individual parties within each election as
the unit of analysis. The position of a national election within a European electoral cycle is the
difference in days between the national and the European election divided by the overall length
of the European legislation period. EP elections are held every five years, which means that the
denominator is approximately equal to 1825 days. As discussed above, European issues are most
salient in national campaigns that coincide with an EP campaign. Hence, I expect the effect of








where NEt is the national election date, EPt the date of the preceding EP election, and EPt+1 the date of the next EP
election.
There are some factors that facilitate challenger parties’ success, which vary across the 27
European member states in the analysis, particularly the degree of party system institutionalisa-
tion or authoritarian legacies (Kriesi 2016). This kind of heterogeneity between countries may
systematically relate to challenger parties’ success on both the European level and the national
level and bias the point estimates. Country-fixed effects hold observed and unobserved variance
between countries constant if this variance is stable over time. We assume that authoritarian
legacies and the institutionalisation of a party system are time-constant after conditioning on
decade dummies. All country-specific covariates that do not vary within decades and might
both influence the vote share of a challenger party in the national and in the European context
are controlled for by cluster ‘de-meaning’ the data in the fixed-effects model. The model estim-
ates the national performance of challenger parties as a function of the interaction between the
EP electoral result, the cycle variable, and the respective constitutive terms. The interaction coef-
ficient can thus be interpreted as the impact of the EP performance moderated by the position of
the cycle variable. The model equation can be formalised as follows:
ÿit = β0 +β1ẍis +β2c̈it +β3(ẍis ∗ c̈it)+βkz̈it + üit (2)
for i = 1. . .27 EU member states; t = 1. . .n national elections in EU member state i, and s = 1. . .8 EP elections preceding
the national elections; where ÿ = yit − ȳi (correspondingly for x,c,z,u); y = vote share of respective party in national
election, x = vote share in EP election, c = position of the national election within a European electoral cycle (see
equation 1), z = vector of control variables. Unit of analysis is the country-election level, regression estimation per
party family (variance of the residuals varies across party families).
The vector of control variables includes time-variant covariates that may systematically relate
to the performance of challenger parties at both levels of governance. The analysis accounts
for the permissiveness of the electoral system by including the logarithm of the average district
magnitude in each country’s national elections (Johnson and Wallack 2010) and the logarithm
of the average district magnitude in the EP elections. While the national electoral thresholds
have not changed within EU member states,3 the model takes the country-specific EP electoral
threshold into account, which in some countries is not time-constant. The literature shows that
the extent of ‘second-orderness’ of a European election varies depending on whether or not
the EP election was a ‘midterm’ election and on the experience that countries have with EP
contests, i.e. the number of EP elections a country has participated in (Hix and Marsh 2011:6;
Marsh 1998:597). The character of the EP elections and the legislative power of the EP itself have
changed since the introduction of the EP elections in 1979. To account for these changes and
for other time-specific unobserved heterogeneity within the observation period, I introduce four
decade dummy variables. Yet, they do not reach conventional levels of statistical significance
in any of the models. To confront the fact that some of the challengers might themselves get
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Figure 1: Number of national elections following an EP election within the same European cycle




Numbers of National Elections
punished in the EP elections if they were in government before, an indicator variable measures
whether the parties were part of the national executive at the time of the respective EP election.
The variable, however, remains insignificant throughout all models (see Table 1). The results are
robust to excluding all challenger populist left, green and populist right actors that have been in
government (see the Online appendix). Finally, the model controls for the state of the economy
(unemployment rate) that might contribute to a high number of protest or anti-government votes
in EP and national elections (International Monetary Fund 2016).
The analysis consists of 174 national elections of EU member states. EP elections take place
every five years, while most European member states hold elections every four years. Every
fourth observation in the data (24.71%) refers to the same EP election result as the previous
country-specific observation (see Figure 1). Yet, while the EP vote share is equivalent for these
cases, the cycle values are necessarily different from each other. This introduces greater variation
among these observations and renders the central interaction term of interest independent from
the previous observations. The cycle variable is very equally distributed (L-Kurtosis: 0.0116),
facilitating the interpretation of the conditional marginal effects.4 The analysis of the central in-
teraction term proceeds as follows. As suggested by Hainmueller et al. (2016), I first test whether
the moderating effect of the cycle variable follows the linear interaction effect (LIE) assumption,
which is relevant to assess hypothesis H2, positing that the marginal effect of the EP vote share
is conditional on the temporal proximity between both elections. The functional form of the
conditioning effect of the cycle variable does not necessarily need to be linear. To test the LIE as-
sumption, I visualise the conditional marginal effects within four equally spaced intervals of the
cycle variable using the mean conditional marginal effect of the EP vote share in each interval.
To obtain these estimates, the proposed binning estimator by Hainmueller et al. (2016) jointly
fits the central interaction to all four individual intervals, while allowing the marginal effects to
freely vary within each interval. A simple Wald test statistic reports whether the linear interac-
tion model and the binning model are statistically equivalent. Based on the results of the Wald
test, I present the respective country fixed-effects regression results with the corresponding poly-
nomial specification of the cycle variable. The Online appendix includes semi-parametric kernel
smoothed estimates to allow for a fully flexible functional form of the marginal effect of the EP
vote share with respect to the position in the electoral cycle. Those semi-parametric estimates
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Figure 2: Marginal effect of Green vote share in EP election on subsequent national election mod-
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further support the respective lower and higher-order polynomial specifications reported in the
main analysis.5 The marginal effect plots show a histogram at the bottom of the figure to help
readers assess whether the estimates are supported by data of the moderating cycle variable.
Results
For Green parties, we find a linear interaction effect. The p-value of 0.43 indicates that the flexible
binning estimates are statistically equivalent to a simple linear interaction model (see column 2
in Table 1).
The conditional marginal effect size is substantively speaking rather small (see Figure 2). A
one-percentage point increase in the European arena improves a Green party’s national result
only by a maximum of 0.37 percentage points when the national election follows very shortly
after an EP election. Yet, the interaction term of the European result and the temporal distance to
the EP election is not robust to using bootstrapped or cluster robust standard errors. It also turns
insignificant when using party-fixed effects and when jackknifing parties. This indicates that
the European result does not serve as a domestic ‘marker’ for these party actors. Scholars have
argued that voters aremore likely to defect from their national vote in the supranational elections
by switching to Green parties if they prefer the environmental issue to be instituted at the EP level
(Carrubba and Timpone 2005:273; Gabel 2000). For the same underlying reasons, they might not
be inclined to cast a congruent vote at the next national election even if they just had supported a
Green party at the previous EP election. The result suggests that the (transnational) policy agenda
of Green party actors mitigates a spillover. While green parties’ policy platform may lend itself
well for a ballot on the European level, supranational success of these actors contributes only
little to their domestic significance. The results show that the performance of Green parties in the
European arena does not encourage bandwagon effects in the next domestic electoral contest. On
the one hand, this might be because of their environmental policy-agenda, which voters perceive
to be located in the supranational arena as argued in the previous literature. On the other hand,
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Table 1: Fixed-effects regression results on national vote share by party families
Populist Green Populist
Radical Left Parties Radical Right
Linear Linear Quadratic
EP Vote 0.636*** 0.377*** 0.905***
(0.078) (0.081) (0.133)




EP Vote ∗ Cycle -0.412*** -0.209** -2.302***
(0.130) (0.100) (0.659)
EP Vote ∗ Cycle2 2.295***
(0.739)
Government at EP election 2.432 0.535 2.469
(2.503) (0.831) (1.664)
Midterm EP 0.655 -0.799** 1.278*
(0.597) (0.365) (0.726)
Unemployment 0.407*** 0.009 0.272***
(0.088) (0.051) (0.091)
EP Elections Participated 1.254** 0.456 0.405
(0.487) (0.295) (0.533)
EP Threshold 3.003*** -0.314 -0.600
(0.520) (0.324) (0.557)
National District Magnitude -0.284 0.079 0.775
(0.933) (0.569) (1.066)
European District Magnitude 1.036 0.468 -0.050
(0.791) (0.484) (0.850)
p-value Wald test (LIE) 0.789 0.430 0.001
Decade Fixed-Effects X X X
Robustness of (Non-) Significance of Interaction Term
Cluster Robust SE X x X
Pairs Cluster Bootstrapped SE X x X
Jackknife Parties X x X
Party Fixed-Effects X x X
BIC 901.136 730.484 936.139
N 174 174 174
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Robustness of interaction
effect: pairs cluster bootstrapped SE to account for small cluster size. Jackknife reruns
analysis while omitting one party each regression. Party-fixed effects uses party-specific
dummies instead of country dummies.
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Figure 3: Marginal effect of Populist Radical Right vote share in EP election on subsequent na-
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Green parties’ European success may also not attract enormous national attention because of
their mostly non-radical policy stances.
For radical right party actors, in contrast, we find considerable empirical support for a non-
linear conditional marginal effect of the EP election result on national gains. The binning estim-
ates indicate that the cycle does not monotonically moderate this marginal effect, but rather fol-
lows the u-shape of a second-order polynomial (see Figure 3). Relying on theWald test, we reject
the null that a naïve linear interaction model and the binning estimates are statistically equival-
ent (p-value: 0.001). As opposed to Green parties, the effect size of the electoral spillover is also
substantively large. During national campaigns that are close in time to an EP election, a strong
second-order result provides the populist radical right with domestic advantages. Whenever the
distance to an EP election is less than a year, those party actors substantially benefit from a
one-percentage point increase in their European fortune by nationally gaining close to the equi-
valent (around 0.8 percentage points). Yet, if the temporal distance to an EP election is large and
a national election falls in the middle of a European electoral cycle, a populist radical right party
retrieves only small marginal gains out of its European success (around 0.3 percentage points,
comparable to the size of the spillover for Green parties).6
The temporal variation in the spillover effect suggests that the salience of European issues in
domestic campaigns brings to the fore a ‘highly symbolic issue that fits [radical right parties’]
traditionalist-communitarian ideology’ (Bornschier 2010:63). When the EP contest comes close
in time to a national election, the radical right can successfully mobilise their opposition against
the European project in the domestic arena. For the populist radical right, the empirical results
give support to hypotheses H1 and H2. The closer the temporal distance between a first-order
and a European second-order election, the higher the chances that a strong EP result of these
party competitors leaves an imprint on their national fortunes.
For the radical left, these hypotheses are, in contrast, only partially corroborated (see Figure
4 and column 1 in Table 1). The Wald test of the binning estimate (p-value: 0.789) indicates
10
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Figure 4: Marginal effect of Populist Radical Left vote share in EP election on subsequent national
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that the moderating effect of the cycle variable follows a linear pattern. The decreasing effect
size over time shows that a strong EP result provides radical left actors with a one-time, quickly
evaporating increase in national visibility rather than with a heightened salience of their policy
issues even in proximity to the next second-order election. While the radical left is positionally
distinctive on the traditional left-right political dimension related to redistributional issues, their
positions on the cross-cutting national demarcation vs. European integration dimension are less
clear-cut. Thus, success in EP elections might make some radical left actors more visible in the
short run, but it may not be likely to change the salience of their core issues in the domestic
arena.
The latter finding is only valid for populist radical right party actors and is robust to: (a) the
exclusion of single parties from the analysis (jackknife procedure)7; and (b) to the estimation
of party-fixed effects instead of country-fixed effects to account for unobserved organisational
differences between parties that might determine both their EP electoral success and subsequent
national gains. The results are also not sensitive to (c) bootstrapping the standard errors to con-
front a possible overconfidence due to the small cluster size within the sample.8 The findings are
(d) robust to other correlates of populist radical right success frequently discussed in the literat-
ure, which might impact these actors’ success on both governance levels, namely the influx of
asylum seekers, the turnout rate in a given election, or potential party-strategic advantages for
radical right parties determined by the left-right position of the largest conservative mainstream
competitor. Finally, the results remain unchanged if those elections that follow a first national
election within the same EP electoral cycle and those elections that are held concurrently with
an EP election (cycle= 0) are excluded from the analysis. The various robustness tests are repor-
ted in the Online appendix. Among the vector of controls, in contrast, most of the variables do
not significantly affect challenger parties’ electoral fortune across different model specifications.
While some of the measures do have a significant effect in the main model reported in Table 1,
they fail to reach statistical significance when pair-clustering standard errors and estimating the
various alternative model specifications, like party-fixed effects (see the Online appendix). The
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only variable that stands out among the vector of controls is the unemployment rate that con-
tributes to an increase in populist radical right success on the national level, confirming previous
research on the macro-correlates of populist right success across Europe (e.g. Arzheimer 2009).
For the populist radical left, in turn, high unemployment does not feed into electoral success
robustly across models.
In the following, I investigate the underlying mechanism driving the spillover effect for the
populist right by: (a) showing that the spillover does not stem from similar levels of support
for the populist right across the European and the national arena; and by (b) showing that the
salience of European integration in domestic campaigns drives the spillover.
Congruence of voters’ party preferences across arenas?
To identify a spillover effect of EP electoral success, I propose a placebo-test assessing whether
both national and EP results are affected by the same unobserved factors rather than by European
success feeding into national success. To the extent that election results measure voters’ party
preferences and a party’s current popularity, the closer to (or further apart from) each other two
elections take place, the greater (lower) the association between the results to be expected. The
voluminous empirical evidence from the second-order literature suggests that different voting
calculi apply to both kinds of elections, which is supported by parties’ different results at con-
current national and European elections. Yet, if we still assume that voters’ party preferences
are partially congruent across the national and supranational arena, an alternative explanation
for the cyclical spillover effect is given by potential similar popularity levels of populist radical
right parties in the EP and national elections.9 If this were the case, however, we should find
the same cyclical pattern when predicting the success of radical right parties in the European
election (dependent variable) conditional on the interaction between temporal distance to the
last national election and the respective electoral result.
However, the placebo-test does not give any support to a similar cyclical spillover effect. The
binning estimate first suggests a linear functional form of a national spillover to the European
area (p-value of the LIE assumption: 0.428). Second, the interaction term between the position
of the European election in the national election and the national vote share is insignificant (and
marginally positive). The full results of this placebo-test along with the respective figures are
reported in the Online appendix.
Supposing that the spillover from the second-order arena to the domestic one were only driven
by a high congruence of voters’ preferences across governance levels, we should, however find
the same decreasing strength of association the greater the temporal distance between both elec-
tions. Yet, the placebo-test shows a different pattern. This indicates that the institution of the EP
elections and the salience of European integration in itself fosters the spillover of populist radical




EP elections as quasi-exogeneous event
It is worth to exploit the quasi-exogenous nature of the EP contest as a political event. To date,
any given member state has consistently participated in the EP elections, rendering the existence
of this political institution and its timing largely exogenous to party actors’ strategic short-term
influence. Hence, a conservative test to assess whether the institution of the EP elections in
itself prompts the salience of populist radical right parties’ issues and fosters their visibility in
the national arena, is given when we reassess the mere impact of the EP elections as an event,
not considering a party’s actual performance therein.
When re-estimating the model and only including the continuous cycle variable as predictor
of a challenger party’s national success instead of the interaction term, the quadratic cycle vari-
able maintains its statistical significance for the radical right (see Table 2).10 The coefficient
indicates the same u-curved relationship between temporal proximity of the two elections and
marginal gains in the national vote shares of populist radical right parties. Exploiting the quasi-
exogeneity of the temporal proximity to the EP contest, we find that the event of the EP election
in itself augments the electoral prospects for populist radical right parties. This is not the case for
populist radical left and green parties whose national performance is not significantly affected
by a temporal proximity to the European contest. Previous research shows that individuals feel
particularly negative about the EU in the year of an EP election (Beaudonnet and Franklin 2016).
Hence, when the European campaigns coincide with the national electoral campaigns, the sali-
ence of Europe in domestic politics accentuates radical right actors’ electoral gains. It appears
that such domestic contests are particularly favourable to increase the radical right’s mobilisa-
tion on anti-EU stances and ‘pulling voters’ who might not have supported them on the basis
of their left–right concerns (van der Eijk and Franklin 2004:47). The European contest seems
to offer party actors who represent both the anti-European and authoritarian-nationalistic at-
titudes of many voters a permeable forum to politicise these issues domestically. The pace of
further deepening and widening of the EU has not always been accompanied by an increase
of citizens’ level of support for further integration. On the contrary, citizens’ Eurosceptic at-
titudes have increased over the years (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). Whenever the European
and the national campaigns coincide, issues relating to further European integration make their
way into the domestic arena. This affects party competition and creates opportunities for such
challengers who favour demarcation as opposed to further integration, namely actors from the
populist right-wing end of the spectrum (Kriesi 2007).
Conclusions
Recently, scholars contended that the European direct elections are not working as elections ‘are
supposed to perform’. They are second-rate in failing to achieve their supposed objectives –
to provide direct policy consequences (Franklin 2017). This different character of the European
contest leaves the Union merely with the intended consequence of decreasing its ‘democratic
deficit’. Following the seminal work of Reif and Schmitt (1980), there is a voluminous literature
on the character of the supranational contest, the voting calculus, and the policy issues involved
therein. Yet, ‘in reality, we find influences running in both directions’ (van der Eijk, Franklin
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Table 2: Fixed-effects regression results on national vote share by party families
Populist Green Populist
Radical Left Parties Radical Right
Linear Linear Quadratic




Controls X X X
Decade Fixed-Effects X X X
Robustness of (Non-) Significance of Interaction Term
Cluster Robust SE X X X
Pairs Cluster Bootstrapped SE X X X
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Robustness of interaction
effect: pairs cluster bootstrapped SE to account for small cluster size.
and Marsh 1996), and the secondary elections themselves impact domestic party systems. This
analysis highlights that a ‘vote against Europe’, particularly once made visible in European elec-
tions, may decisively shape domestic elections. The supranational contest offers populist radical
right actors an opportunity structure to mobilise voters based on their antagonism towards the
elite-consensus on European integration. By shifting the focus to the national arena, this paper
first shows that the direct second-order elections have important national consequences. While
anecdotal evidence holds that the EP elections provided parties like AfD, Front National or the
Sweden Democrats with the first favourable opportunity for gaining momentum and translat-
ing their success into national power, the present analysis offers a systematic analysis of such
spillover effects across all European member states and national elections since 1979. Second,
the study disentangles the mechanisms behind these electoral spillover effects, corroborating the
idea that populist radical right parties draw crucial momentum from EP success. If national and
European elections are close in time, the salience of European integration boosts the domestic
electoral prospects of radical right parties.
Future research is necessary to explore the potential variation in the European spillover ef-
fects across different party systems. Mainstream parties’ responses to European success of a
populist right challenger, the policy-influence of those actors within a country, and country-
specific variation in the evolution of saliency of European integration might crucially mediate
the cyclical spillover effect. This might put in motion or prevent further spillover effects from
the national to the European arena. Future research should also address the underlying micro-
level mechanisms. Individual-level panel data across European countries could help to assess
whether individuals who turn out for a challenger party in the EP elections are also more likely
to cast a similar ‘habitual’ ballot in the following national contest. If this were the case, the EP
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elections would contribute to individual partisan re- or dealignment, working as a ‘virtual pump’
that may pull impressionable voters from mainstream parties (Franklin 2017). Dinas and Riera
(2018) show that individuals who first became eligible for a European election are more likely to
support a small party than individuals who became eligible for a national election, arguing that
the act of voting socialises individuals into such voting patterns (Dinas and Riera 2018). In light
of the comparatively low turnout levels in EP elections, such habitual voting may only partially
account for the electoral spillover of populist radical right success. The experimental evidence
from the bandwagon literature and the empirical results in this paper support the idea that also
individuals who did not participate in the European contest are encouraged to cast a ballot for a
populist radical right party after its success in the supranational arena, based on the consensus
cues they take from mass support levels in the supranational arena. This hypothesis should be
empirically addressed by future research.
The salience of European integration seems decisive in explaining the populist right spillover
effects to the domestic arena. This salience is augmented when the national election occurs in
close temporal proximity to the EP contest. Neither green nor populist radical left actors are able
to similarly capitalise on European success. While populist radical right parties do play a part
in politicising Europe, they are also among the most hostile actors towards further European
integration. In view of their opposition to an integrative Europe, it seems rather ironic that the
supranational contest fosters the ascendency of just these opponents of the European idea.
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1. The different turnout levels in European and national elections, however, seem to relate
mostly to the timing of the EP elections on the structural level and to patterns of habitual voting
on the individual level (Franklin, van der Eijk et al. 1996; Schmitt and Mannheimer 1991). Thus,
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the difference in participation levels in the EP and the national contest does not evoke systematic
benefits for challenger parties in EP elections.
2. The sample includes 27 country-clusters since Croatia does not have sufficient observations
to perform the within-estimation, i.e. two national elections each following an EP election.
3. One exception is a single election in France (1986); the results are not sensitive to the inclu-
sion of the national electoral threshold as a covariate.
4. The low value of the L-Kurtosis indicates that the distribution and the shape of the cycle vari-
able is not characterised by strong outliers, safeguarding against extrapolation of the marginal
effects based on little supporting data (Hosking 1990).
5. The semi-parametric estimates result from a series of locally linear regressions using kernel
re-weighting based on the distance between each value of the cycle and each evaluation point.
6. This small improvement differs statistically significantly (on the 95% level) from an electoral
spillover in a national election being held up until half a year after a European election and (on
the 90% level) from an electoral spillover in a national election being held half a year ahead of a
European election.
7. The results are also robust towards the inclusion of contested cases, like the Dutch List Pim
Fortyn, the United Kingdom Independence Party, and the True Finns.
8. The p-values are estimated using pairs cluster bootstrapped t-statistics for fixed effects panel
linear models, see Esarey and Menger (2016) for a detailed discussion.
9. Based on the previous findings for the radical left and the Greens, this alternative explan-
ation would imply that: (a) voters’ party preferences generally have a higher congruence for
the radical right across governance levels than for the two other actors; and that (b) that those
preferences are less stable across time. I remain agnostic about the likelihood of those assump-
tions and strengthen the argument for a ‘momentum effect’ by rejecting the potential alternative
explanation.
10. The respective linear or quadratic cycle specifications, which did not find empirical support
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